到底是什么把美国这个共和政体从特朗普的败坏中拯救的

What Really Saved the Republic From Trump?

拯救了美国的不是我们的宪法里设计的权力制衡制度。

It wasn’t our constitutional system of checks and balances.

美国人在学校里学到这些说法：美国宪法的主要功能是节制行政部门的权力，即制约要想成为暴君的总统；史上其它共和国陷入过独裁统治（罗马共和国、魏玛共和国等），但我们的主要由詹姆斯-麦迪逊精心设计的宪法制衡体系，保护我们不堕入专制统治。

Americans are taught that the main function of the U.S. Constitution is the control of executive power: curtailing presidents who might seek to become tyrants. Other republics have lapsed into dictatorships (the Roman Republic, the Weimar Republic, the Republic of China and so on), but our elaborate constitutional system of checks and balances, engineered largely by James Madison, protects us from despotism.

这就是我们大致的想法。但特朗普总统执政后的咄咄逼人的专制冲动，虽然大都被挫败而无法实现，应该促使我们重新审视宪法制衡的作用的设想，因为我们的制衡制度 —— 即赋予政府的（立法、行政、司法）三个分支彼此控制和互相影响的权力的安排 —— 在阻止特朗普先生获得他似乎想要的无限权力方面，作用发挥微弱得令人失望的。

Or so we think. The presidency of Donald Trump, aggressive in its autocratic impulses but mostly thwarted from realizing them, should prompt a re-examination of that idea. For our system of checks and balances, in which the three branches of government are empowered to control or influence the actions of the others, played a disappointingly small role in stopping Mr. Trump from assuming the unlimited powers he seemed to want.

真正将美国共和政体从特朗普先生手中拯救出来的，是另一套对行政部门的约束，是由联邦检察官、军官、和各州主管选举事务的官员所维护的一套非正式和非官方的制度规范。你可以把他们遵循的这些价值观称为我们的 "不成文的宪法"。不管怎么称呼，它们是挫败特朗普的决定性的因素。

What really saved the Republic from Mr. Trump was a different set of limits on the executive: an informal and unofficial set of institutional norms upheld by federal prosecutors, military officers and state elections officials. You might call these values our “unwritten constitution.” Whatever you call them, they were the decisive factor.

的确，法院有时对特朗普先生的暴虐倾向提供了一种制衡，比如法院驳回了他对今年选举的滥诉攻击，并驳回了他在未经正当程序的情况下推翻儿童入境暂缓遣返计划的努力。但在其他案件中，如他的反穆斯林旅行禁令，法院一直不愿意超越行动表面来查明其中的违宪动机。更笼统地说，特朗普先生倾向于快速行动，而法院则是缓慢的；特朗普先生用威胁来运作，而法院无法对威胁作出裁决。

It’s true that the courts at times provided a check on Mr. Trump’s tyrannical tendencies, as with their dismissal of his frivolous attacks on the election and their striking down of his effort to overturn the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program without appropriate process. But in other cases, such as his anti-Muslim travel ban, the courts have been too unwilling to look beyond form to ferret out unconstitutional motive. More generally, Mr. Trump has tended to move fast, while the courts are slow, and to operate by threat, which the courts cannot adjudicate.

更重大的失败是国会。麦迪逊的意图是让国会成为对总统的主要制衡。不幸的是，这种设计有一个关键的缺陷（正如麦迪逊自己也意识到的）。这个缺陷就是国会容易受到政党政治的影响。事实证明，如果国会两院中有一个机构的多数成员表现出对其政党的忠诚度高于对国会的忠诚度，那么国会将无法可靠地制衡那个政党的总统。这就是特朗普先生和共和党控制的参议院所发生的事情（注：作者指的是虽然有7位共和党参议员加入民主党投票弹劾特朗普，但达不到三分之二的法定多数）。

The bigger and more important failure was Congress. Madison intended Congress to be the primary check on the president. Unfortunately, that design has a key flaw (as Madison himself realized). The flaw is vulnerability to party politics. It turns out that if a majority of members of at least one body of Congress exhibits a higher loyalty to its party than to Congress, Congress will not function as a reliable check on a president of that same party. This was what happened with Mr. Trump and the Republican-controlled Senate.

这个问题长期存在，但在过去的四年里，这个问题变得很凶猛。面对一个无视规则的总统，参议院的共和党人以大大小小的方式让他为所欲为。他们允许特朗普用临时代理部门首长来管理联邦政府（译者注：吴教授这里指的是特朗普频繁任命临时的代理部长来掌控政府部门，绕过需要国会审批同意的正式部门首长任命程序）。他们允许特朗普宣称他有权在未经国会批准的情况下攻击伊朗。总统弹劾程序退化成为国会成员按党派路线投票而不是按是非对错投票。參議院成了橡皮圖章，让总统行政部门得以越權。

The problem is chronic, but over the last four years it became virulent. Confronted with a president who was heedless of rules, Senate Republicans, in ways large and small, let him do what he wanted. They allowed acting appointees to run the federal government. They allowed him to claim a right to attack Iran without congressional approval. The impeachment process was reduced to nothing but a party-line vote. The Senate became a rubber stamp for executive overreach.

与国会的失败相对照，特朗普总统的最恶劣的行动想法是被上述 “不成文的宪法” 的三个支柱抵御了。第一个支柱是總統和聯邦刑事检察部门之間的慣常分離，虽然司法部是行政部門的一部分（注：这里指的是美国联邦检察官不接受总统的办案指令的传统）。第二是军队传统的政治中立性，尽管总统是武装部队的总司令。第三是各州选举事务官员的个人操守（注：这里指的是各州负责选举事务管理的官员不以党派利益行事，在选举管理中保持中立和公正）。

Instead, the president’s worst impulses were neutralized by three pillars of the unwritten constitution. The first is the customary separation between the president and federal criminal prosecution (even though the Department of Justice is part of the executive branch). The second is the traditional political neutrality of the military (even though the president is the commander in chief of the armed forces). The third is the personal integrity of state elections officials.

如果这三个非正式的 "防火墙" 中的任何一个失效了，特朗普总统可能此时会获得他的第二个更加专制的任期。但是幸运的是，这些 “防火墙” 守住了，对此共和国应该心存感激。

If any of these informal “firewalls” had failed, President Trump might be on his way to a second and more autocratic term. But they held firm, for which the Republic should be grateful.

考虑第一道防火墙：检察独立。宪法中没有提到行政部门的检察起诉职能，仅根据宪法文本说的 "行政权应赋予美国总统"，有些人可能会认为（有些人甚至坚持认为）总统有权命令联邦检察官听从他的命令。特朗普先生在2017年宣称具备这种权力，他说："我有绝对的权利要求司法部做我想做的事情。"

Consider the first firewall: prosecutorial independence. The prosecution function of the executive branch is not mentioned in the Constitution, and based on the text alone — “the executive power shall be vested in a president of the United States” — some might think (and some have even insisted) that the president has the power to order federal prosecutors to do his bidding. Mr. Trump claimed that power in 2017, saying, “I have absolute right to do what I want to do with the Justice Department.”

但长期以来有一个不成文的规范认为，总统总的来说不应该掌控执法决策，特别是刑事诉讼。这就是为什么在整个秋天，即使特朗普先生敦促他任命的司法部官员公开宣布对拜登家族进行刑事调查，司法部没有遵命。特朗普先生任命的司法人员中没有一个人愿意公开调查乔-拜登或其家庭成员，更不用说发出起诉书或民事申诉了。（译者注：为避免影响选民的投票决策，司法部有不在竞选季节公布有政治敏感性的案件情况的规矩，司法部长在每个选举季节之前会重申该规矩）

But an unwritten norm has long held that the president should not dictate law enforcement decisions in general, and criminal prosecutions in particular. That is why, throughout this fall, even as Mr. Trump urged his appointees in the Justice Department to openly announce a criminal investigation into the Biden family, they did not comply. None of Mr. Trump’s appointees was willing to openly investigate Joe Biden or his family members, let alone issue an indictment or civil complaint.

想象一下，如果司法部遵循特朗普先生的指示，如果某联邦检察官响应特朗普先生的律师朱利亚尼的挑事而起诉指控拜登先生犯有舞弊罪。即使拜登先生最终在法庭上获胜，他在选举期间要费力公开对抗这种指控也将是一场政治和后勤的噩梦。幸好，不成文的宪法（译者注：即上述的司法机关办案不受总统指令的规范）阻止了对选举过程的这类攻击。

Imagine if the Justice Department had followed Mr. Trump’s lead. Imagine if in response to the provocations of Mr. Trump’s lawyer Rudolph Giuliani, a U.S. attorney had charged Mr. Biden with criminal fraud. Even if Mr. Biden ultimately prevailed in court, publicly fighting such charges during an election would be a political and logistical nightmare. The unwritten constitution blocked this line of attack on the electoral process.

检察机关的独立性并不限于拒绝起诉特朗普先生的政治对手，这种独立性还延伸到检察机关会起诉特朗普的盟友。在过去的四年里，特朗普先生的六名亲信被定罪，七名被起诉，包括他的顾问班农、他的竞选委员会主席马纳福特、和他的私人律师科恩（译者注：科恩是特朗普集团公司的二把手、行政副总裁）。这样的起诉在独裁统治下是不可想象的。

Prosecutorial independence was not limited to refusing to indict Mr. Trump’s political adversaries; it also extended to indicting his allies. Over the past four years, six of Mr. Trump’s close associates have been convicted and seven were indicted, including his adviser Stephen Bannon, his campaign chairman Paul Manafort and his lawyer Michael Cohen. Such prosecutions would be unimaginable in a dictatorship.

这些情况并不是说特朗普先生的司法部长巴尔是维持无党派中立性的典范，也不是说司法部一直恪守公平。这些情况显示的是，即使在一个由忠诚于总统的司法部长掌管的司法部里，非成文的规范也是多么强大。

None of this is to suggest that William Barr, Mr. Trump’s attorney general, has served as a model of nonpartisan behavior, or that the Justice Department has been scrupulously fair. What it does show is how powerful unwritten norms can be, even in a department run by a loyalist.

非成文宪法的第二道防火墙是美国军方长期以来反对介入国内政治的传统。这对于节制特朗普先生的军国主义本能是非常宝贵的。

The second firewall of the unwritten constitution was the U.S. military’s longstanding custom against getting involved in domestic politics. It was invaluable in checking Mr. Trump’s militaristic instincts.

2020年6月1日，随着因乔治-弗洛伊德被杀而引发的抗议和反抗议活动变得带有暴力性和破坏性，特朗普先生出现在白宫玫瑰园，谴责他所谓的 "国内恐怖行为"。他说，如果有必要，他将 "部署美国军队"，以 "捍卫美国公民的生命和财产"。在随后的合影中，他的两侧是司法部长巴尔先生、国防部长埃斯珀和身着军装的参谋长联席会议主席米利将军。很快，来自第82空降师的现役部队被安置在华盛顿城下。

On June 1, as protests and counterprotests occasioned by the killing of George Floyd became violent and destructive, Mr. Trump appeared in the Rose Garden of the White House and denounced what he called “acts of domestic terror.” He said he would “deploy the United States military” if necessary to “defend the life and property” of U.S. citizens. In a subsequent photo op, he was flanked by Mr. Barr, Defense Secretary Mark Esper and Gen. Mark Milley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who was clad in military fatigues. Soon, active duty forces from the 82nd Airborne Division were positioned outside of Washington.

特朗普先生的安排有成文法的支持。无论是宪法还是任何国会法规都不会阻止总统直接命令现役军人镇压抗议活动。宪法规定总统是武装部队的总司令，1807年的《叛乱法》允许总统动用军队或国民警卫队镇压内乱，该法律为通常禁止在国内事务动用军队的总的规则提供了一个广泛可行的例外。

Mr. Trump’s plan had the written law on its side. Neither the Constitution nor any congressional statute would have prevented the president from directly ordering active duty military to suppress the protests. The Constitution makes the president the commander in chief of the armed forces and the Insurrection Act of 1807 allows the president to use the military or National Guard to suppress civil disorder, providing a broad exception to the general rule barring domestic use of the military.

当时对国家来说是一个异常危险的时刻。正如各个衰亡了的共和国的历史所表明的那样，当军队参与国内政治时，军人往往会不放手而继续掌权下去。但在特朗普先生发表讲话两天后，国防部长埃斯伯先生公开与总统决裂，强调现役部队只应 "作为最后的手段，只有在最紧急和最严峻的情况下才可在国内使用"。他最后说："我不支持援引《叛乱法》。" （译者注：特朗普在落选总统之后，于2020年11月9日将国防部长埃斯伯撤职）

It was an extraordinarily dangerous moment for the country. As the history of lapsed republics suggests, when the military becomes involved in domestic politics, it tends to stay involved. But two days after Mr. Trump’s speech, Mr. Esper publicly broke with the president, stressing that active duty forces should be used domestically only “as a matter of last resort, and only in the most urgent and dire of situations.” He concluded that “I do not support invoking the Insurrection Act.”

米利将军后来为参与特朗普先生的拍照活动公开道歉。他说："我在那个时刻的在场，留下了军队参与国内政治的形象。" 他补充说，"我不应该在那里跟总统照相。"

General Milley later issued a public apology for participating in Mr. Trump’s photo op. “My presence in that moment,” he said, “created a perception of the military involved in domestic politics.” He added, “I should not have been there.”

特朗普先生的这些安排不是触犯了法律，而是触犯了一条不成文的规则。几天后，聚集在华盛顿周围的82空降师现役部队被调回原驻地。虽然经历了短暂的考验，但军队不干政的规范得以坚守。

Mr. Trump’s plans ran afoul not of the law, but of an unwritten rule. In a few days, the active duty troops gathered around Washington were sent home. Though briefly tested, the norm had held.

不成文宪法的最后一道防火墙是各州选举事务官员的正直。制定选举规则和计票的人们如果腐败，会对民主规程造成显然威胁。例如，在俄罗斯，其中央选举委员会在普京总统执政期间的中立性屡遭质疑，尤其是考虑到该机构倾向于取消主要反对派人物和政党的参选资格。

The final firewall of the unwritten constitution has been the integrity of state elections officials. Corruption of the people and institutions that set election rules and count votes is an obvious threat to the democratic process. In Russia, for example, the neutrality of its Central Election Commission during President Vladimir Putin’s rule has been repeatedly questioned, especially given the tendency of that body to disqualify leading opposition figures and parties.

佐治亚州务卿拉芬斯伯格是该州最高选举事务管理官员。他的故事证明了在激烈的竞选活动中存在的对选举过程完好性的潜在威胁。在这个以微弱优势支持了民主党总统候选人拜登先生的州里，拉芬斯伯格先生是一名共和党人，总的来说负责投票事务。

The story of Brad Raffensperger, the secretary of state in Georgia and its top elections official, testifies to the potential threats to an election’s integrity during a heated campaign. Mr. Raffensperger, a Republican, was loosely in charge of the vote in a state that went narrowly for Mr. Biden.

拉芬斯伯格先生的选举事务工作受到本党高层成员的攻击和贬抑。批评者包括佐治亚州的两位联邦参议员珀杜和勒夫勒等著名政治人物。两人都要求拉拉芬斯伯格先生辞职，没有其他明显的理由，就是因为他未能阻止拜登先生赢得该州的选举。

In that capacity, Mr. Raffensperger was attacked and disparaged by higher-ranking members of his own party. This included such prominent political figures as Georgia’s two senators, David Perdue and Kelly Loeffler. Both demanded Mr. Raffensperger resign for no apparent reason other than his failure to prevent Mr. Biden from winning the state.

尽管压力很大，但拉芬斯伯格先生和该州州长坎普与全国绝大多数州选举官员一样，保持对规则的坚守。他们拒绝在没有充分证据的情况下 "发现" 投票舞弊（译者注：他们受到特朗普党人的压力，要他们用存在舞弊为理由调整选举结果让特朗普赢得选举）。党派忠诚在这一时刻似乎还没有致命地危害计票过程。

Despite the pressure, Mr. Raffensperger and the state’s governor, Brian Kemp, held steady, along with an overwhelming majority of state elections officials around the country. They have refused to “discover” voting fraud without good evidence of it. Party loyalty — at this point — seems not to have fatally corrupted the vote-counting process.

这个可喜的结果是否可以归功于宪法设计呢？其实不然。各州的地位是宪法设计的重要组成部分，宪法也确实赋予了它们在联邦选举中的核心作用。但就確保投票過程的公正性而言，似乎最重要的不是憲法結構，而是各州選舉官員的個人操守。他们对公平投票的职业承诺，可能使共和国熬过了一场生存危机。

Might this welcome result be credited to constitutional design? Not really. The states are an important part of the constitutional design, and the document does give them a central role to play in federal elections. But what seems to have mattered most, in terms of ensuring the integrity of the voting process, was less the constitutional structure and more the personal integrity of the state elections officials. Their professional commitment to a fair vote may have spared the Republic an existential crisis.

麦迪逊有句名言："如果人是天使，就不需要政府了。" 愤世嫉俗的人把这句话理解为我们永远不应该相信人，而应该只依靠对政府权力的结构性控制。

Madison famously wrote, “If men were angels, no government would be necessary.” Cynical minds have read this line to mean that we should never trust people and should rely only on structural controls on government power.

过去的四年表明了一些不同的情况，即宪法架构的制衡作用可能被高估了。我们共和国的生存如果不是更多的取决于，至少也是同样地取决于政府人员的德行，特别是公务员、检察官和军队领导人对规范的坚守。我们对职业精神和体制机构这些东西太习以为常了，对美国存在认真履行职责的工作人员也太过习以为常。但是，正如世界上每一个主要道德传统体系所教导的那样，任何外在的约束都不能完全取代个人坚持做正确事情的执着。

The last four years suggest something different: Structural checks can be overrated. The survival of our Republic depends as much, if not more, on the virtue of those in government, particularly the upholding of norms by civil servants, prosecutors and military officials. We have grown too jaded about things like professionalism and institutions, and the idea of men and women who take their duties seriously. But as every major moral tradition teaches, no external constraint can fully substitute for the personal compulsion to do what is right.

在我们这个不信任的时代，期望人们在意道德和职业义务责任，听起来可能很天真。但麦迪逊也看到了这种信任的必要性。他写道："人类有一定程度的堕落"，但也具备 "一定的让人们崇敬和有信心的人性品质"。他认为，一个行之有效的共和政府有赖于 "以这些品质的存在为前提，甚于任何其他形式的政府对这些品质的依赖。"

It may sound naïve in our untrusting age to hope that people will care about ethics and professional duties. But Madison, too, saw the need for this trust. “There is a degree of depravity in mankind,” he wrote, but also “qualities in human nature which justify a certain portion of esteem and confidence.” A working republican government, he argued, “presupposes the existence of these qualities in a higher degree than any other form.”

我们把这叫做公民美德，归根结底，没有其它可以真正替代得了的选项。

It is called civic virtue, and at the end of the day, there is no real alternative.